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ABSTRACT
Data-driven approaches are becoming increasingly crucial for modeling and performance
monitoring of complex dynamical systems. Such necessity stems from complex interactions
among sub-systems and high dimensionality that render majority of first-principle based
methods insufficient. This work explores the capability of a recently proposed probabilistic
graphical modeling technique called spatiotemporal pattern network (STPN) in capturing
Granger causality among observations in a dynamical system. In this context, we introduce
the notion of Granger-STPN (G-STPN) inspired by the notion of Granger causality. We
compare the metrics used in the two frameworks for increasing memory in a dynamical
system, and show that the metric for G-STPN can be approximated by transfer entropy.
We apply this new framework for anomaly detection and root cause analysis in a robotic
platform.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
Large-scale cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are being explored widely in various applica-
tion sectors, e.g., transportation networks (1), integrated buildings (2), robotic networks (3),
wind farms (4), and smart home Internet of Things (IoT) (5). In such systems, the inter-
actions between different parts or subsystems are critically important for the purposes of
control and decision-making. While physics-based methods model such interactions using
first principles, it becomes significantly complicated as the number of subsystems increases
along with their complex interactions. Therefore, data-driven methods have been receiving
considerable attention from the industry and academia (6; 7) as they tend to be more scal-
able and accurate. However, modeling spatiotemporal causal interactions is non-trivial and
crucial for the sake of performance monitoring and diagnose issues as well as developing
advanced control techniques. For example, information theoretic measures such as Granger
Causality can give relevant insights when considering the effectiveness of control mecha-
nisms (8). Although identifying such causal relations has been explored in neuroscience (9),
finance (10), and even social sciences (11), the applications to large-scale cyber-physical
systems have not been explored sufficiently.
Recently, a probabilistic graphical modeling technique called spatiotemporal pattern
network (STPN) has been shown to be quite effective in modeling distributed cyber-physical
systems using multivariate time series observation from the system. Built upon the concepts
of Symbolic Dynamic Filtering (12), this data-driven framework has been used in a variety
of applications to diagnose and predict system behavior. For example, it has been used for
prediction of wind energy (13), residential energy disaggregation (2), and root-cause analysis
2of physical faults and cyber anomalies in CPSs (14). Although STPN attempts to capture
relational patterns among different observations or sub-systems using information-theoretic
measures, a rigorous causality analysis hasn’t been performed.
This work explores the capability of STPN in capturing Granger causality among ob-
servations in a dynamical system. In this context, we introduce a variant of STPN namely,
Granger-STPN (G-STPN) that leverages the concept of transfer entropy computed between
two symbolic time series that can capture Granger causality. The key difference between
STPN and G-STPN is that G-STPN needs to consider the product state space of the two
symbolic time series as opposed to individual state space consideration in STPN. Therefore,
G-STPN may suffer from scalability issues while considering more memory or longer history
for the symbolic time series observations. However, in some systems even increasing the
memory of system under consideration for joint states, does not significantly increase di-
mensions of the product space. Even so, we borrow a state merging approach from previous
work to apply G-STPN to a practical problem of anomaly detection involving an industrial
robotic platform. For single node anomalies, our framework is able to isolate the causes of
anomaly using root cause analysis approach.
Contributions
1. Extend the recently proposed STPN framework as a non-linear model of granger
causality. We call it Granger STPN (G-STPN).
2. Use G-STPN for performance monitoring of an industrial manipulator by using anomaly
detection and root cause analysis approaches.
3CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Formulation of Granger causality
In this section, we will briefly discuss the concept and formulation of Granger causality.
In the simplest form, the core idea of Granger causality is that a process X Granger causes
Y if it helps in increasing the prediction power of a model based on the past history of X
and Y than that based on the past history of Y alone. We will go through the essentials
in brief. Let F (xt|xkt−1, ykt−1) denote the distribution function of the variable X (call it
target variable), conditional on the joint (k-lag) history xkt−1, ykt−1 of both itself and the
variable Y (call it source variable), and let F (xt|xkt−1) denote the distribution function of
Xt conditional on just its own k-history. Then variable Y is said to Granger cause variable
X (8) (with k lags) iff:
F (xt|xkt−1, ykt−1) 6= F (xt|xkt−1) (2.1)
Granger’s formulation was based on vector autoregressive modeling (VAR). Let Xt and Yt be
two multivariate real-valued, zero-mean, jointly stationary stochastic processes. Consider
the nested VAR models:
Xt =
k∑
i=1
AiXt−i +
k∑
i=1
BiYt−i + t (2.2)
Xt =
k∑
i=1
A˜iXt−i + ˜t (2.3)
The model has parameters Ai, Bi, A˜i and the covariance matrices Σ(t) (we will denote as
Σ), Σ(˜t) (we will denote as Σ˜). Here t, ˜t are the residuals assumed to be serially uncorre-
4lated. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 denote the full and reduced models respectively. Granger, in
his original approach views equations 2.2 and 2.3 as predictive models for the target vari-
able X in terms of the joint past history of X and Y . Accordingly, the Y −→ X Granger
causality statistic attempts to quantify the degree to which the full model yields a better
prediction of the target variable than the reduced model. Thus, Granger causality from Y
to X it is given by:
F kY−→X ≡ log(
|Σ˜|
|Σ|) (2.4)
Where |.| denotes matrix determinant. The determinant of covariance matrix of residuals is
also known as generalized variance. Granger causality is linear and parametric by definition.
2.1.2 Formulation of transfer entropy
This section introduces the preliminaries for another non parametric and non linear
causality metric - transfer entropy. We first state the Shannon entropy and Kullback en-
tropy, which are given by the following expression, respectively:
HI =
∑
n
p(i)log(p(i)) (2.5)
KI =
∑
n
p(i)log
(
p(i)
q(i)
)
(2.6)
where i = 1, 2, ..., n, for all states (total of n) the process I can assume, p(i) and q(i)
are the probability distribution. The definition of Kullback divergence can be extended
for a process having a joint distribution p(i, j) which is erroneously assumed to have been
enumerated by two independent distributions p(i) and p(j) to define mutual information
between two processes I and J generating observations {i} and {j} respectively.
M IJ =
∑
m,n
p(i, j)log
(
p(i, j)
p(i)p(j)
)
(2.7)
Mutual information can be quantified in terms of entropy as
M IJ = HI +HJ −HIJ , (2.8)
5which is always greater than 0 and is symmetric with respect to I and J . This prevents
observing “information flows” from one subsystem to another. Also, there is no sense of
“history of observed data” involved in this formulation. Transfer Entropy tries to deal with
this issue. In the context of information theory, we convert continuous time domain signal
into a discretized symbol sequence. In this work we use the Symbolic Dynamic Filtering
technique (12) to obtain this. We first give the conditional entropy as follows:
HI|J =
∑
n
p(i, j)log(p(i|j)) = HIJ −HJ (2.9)
We consider a length of history (k), and systems I and J generating in+1, i
k
n := {in, in−1, ..., in−k}
(the k lag history of the sequence I) and jkn := {jn, jn−1, ..., jn−k}.(the k lag history of the
sequence J). According to (15) transfer entropy for two systems is defined as the difference
of conditional entropies as follows:
TI→J = HJ |J− −HJ |J−I− (2.10)
where I and J correspond to in+1 and jn+1, and I
− and J− are the histories of processes I
and J , corresponding to ikn and j
k
n respectively. There exists efficient methods in literature
to calculate both the values of conditional entropies as given by the following equations
H(In|Ikn, Jkn) = −E[logp(In|Ikn, Jkn)] (2.11)
H(In|Ikn) = −E[logp(In|Ikn)] (2.12)
On application of equation 2.9 to equation 2.10, and substituting we find that:
TI→J =
∑
p(jn+1, j
k
n, i
k
n)log(jn+1|jkn, ikn)
−
∑
p(jn+1, j
k
n)log(jn+1|jkn)
(2.13)
There is a significance of k in the numerical form of transfer entropy. It controls how deep
we investigate the history of both the variables. If a Markov chain of order k is assumed to
generate these observations, we have:
p(jn+1, j
k
n) = p(jn+1, j
k
n, i
k
n) (2.14)
6In reality, the Markov assumption may not hold. Therefore, according to the Kullback-
Liebler divergence from the generalized Markov assumption (16) we have :
TI→J =
∑
jn+1,jkn,i
k
n
p(jn+1, j
k
n, i
k
n)log
(
p(jn+1|jkn, ikn)
p(jn+1|jkn)
)
(2.15)
We consider this in a symbolic domain, thus it is an expression for symbolic transfer entropy,
which is elaborated in detail in (17). Equation 2.15 can be calculated in a more efficient
manner (although approximately in the symbolic domain) using equation 2.10. In (18) the
authors have shown that the transfer entropy is equivalent to Granger causality for Gaussian
variables.
7CHAPTER 3. GRANGER-STPN FRAMEWORK
In this section we extend the STPN to Granger-STPN (G-STPN). First, the STPN
framework is revisited. For more details, please see (13; 2).
3.1 STPN
The STPN is a Graph, the nodes of which are defined using xD-Markov machines (13).
An xD-Markov machine is a five tuple which signifies the state transition matrices between
different systems. An STPN is intended to portray strengths of ”causality” between different
nodes of the graph which correspond to the variables of a multivariate time series under
observation. We give the definition of STPN as follows:
Definition 3.1.1 A STPN is a 4-tuple W = (QI ,ΣJ ,ΠIJ ,M IJ):(I, J denote nodes of the
STPN)
1. QI = {q1, q2, , q|QI |} is the state set corresponding to symbol sequences SI ;
2. ΣJ = {σ0, ..., σ|ΣJ |−1} is the alphabet set of symbol sequence SJ ;
3. ΠIJ is the symbol generation matrix of size |QI |×|ΣJ |, the ijth element of ΠIJ denotes
the probability of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string S
J while making a transi-
tion from the state qi in the symbol sequence S
I ; while self-symbol generation matrices
are called atomic patterns (APs) i.e., I = J , cross-symbol generation matrices are
called relational patterns (RPs) i.e., when I 6= J .
4. M IJ denotes a metric that can represent the importance of the learnt pattern (or
degree of causality) for I → J which is a function of ΠIJ .
8A visualization of STPN is provided in figure 3.1. As defined above, we learn two
types patterns in an STPN, namely relational pattern (RP) to capture the capability of a
sequence in predicting another sequence and atomic pattern (AP) to capture self-prediction
capability of a symbol sequence. Recall the definition of Granger-causality (19), a time
evolving variable I Granger-causes a time-evolving variable J if predictions of J based on
J ’s past values and on I’s past values are better than J ’s predictions considering only
its own past values. Therefore, to identify whether a sequence Granger-causes another
in the context of STPN, we need to compare the information contents of AP and RP as
well as examine how they jointly enable the prediction of the target sequence. However,
as STPN only uses individual state spaces to describe AP and RP, it may be difficult to
compare them without rigorous normalization processes and to compute the joint prediction
capability. Therefore, we consider a variant of the STPN framework, called Granger-STPN
(G-STPN) that considers the joint/product state space. In this case, the relational patterns
in STPN get replaced by the joint patterns as shown in figure 3.1. We rigorously define
Granger-STPN (G-STPN) in the sequel.
3.2 G-STPN framework
In this section, We introduce the definition of Granger-STPN framework as shown in
figure 3.1. The Granger-STPN follows the definition of STPN while changes are primarily
made to the part (3) of the definition. Formally, we have
Definition 3.2.1 A Granger-STPN is a 6-tuple W = (QI , QJ ,ΣJ , τ IJ ,ΠIJ , T IJ): (I, J de-
note nodes of the Granger-STPN which are basically two different variables of a multivariate
time series where causality is investigated)
1. QI = {q1, q2, ..., q|QI |} is the state set corresponding to all k-lag embeddings of symbol
sequences SI ;
9Figure 3.1 STPN framework (blue)and G-STPN framework (green) involving systems I
and J
2. QJ = {q1, q2, ..., q|QJ |} is the state set corresponding to all k-lag embeddings of symbol
sequences SJ ;
3. ΣJ = {σ0, ..., σ|ΣJ |−1} is the alphabet set of symbol sequence SJ ;
4. τ IJ is the joint state-symbol generation matrix of size |QI | × |QJ | × |ΣJ |, the ijth
element of τ IJ denotes the probability of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string
SJ while making a transition from the state qi ∈ QI and (jointly) state qj ∈ QJ such
a pattern is called joint pattern between nodes of I and J ;
5. ΠJ is the self state symbol generation matrix of size |QJ |×|ΣJ |, the ijth element of ΠJ
denotes the probability of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string S
J while making
a transition from the state qj ∈ QJ . Such a pattern is called atomic pattern in node
J . Alternatively, it can be viewed as a parameter matrix that can be used to calculate
active information storage (AIS).
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6. T IJ denotes a metric that can represent causality (degree of influence of variation of
J on I), denoted I → J which is a function of τ IJ , and here we define it as a log
likelihood ratio test statistic of a short time window realization of the joint process
(I, J).
Remark 3.2.1 Based on Section 2.1 it can be observed that the difference between STPN
and G-STPN is whether the history of one process itself is taken into account when using
another process to predict it. Equivalently speaking, in STPN, the relational patterns between
different systems are considered solely without the atomic patterns. Intuitively, the G-STPN
should be more accurate for capturing the causal relationship between the systems. It can
be suggested that STPN approximates G-STPN under some special conditions. It is evident
that the importance metric of STPN is susceptible to common cause effects which may
interfere with causal inference, but the importance metric of G-STPN is, as we will show
shortly, very closely related to transfer entropy, which enables it to get around such effects
by separating past histories.
3.3 Joint state merging algorithm
While modeling the joint state symbol generation matrix we would require the row vec-
tors of τxy to be statistically independent of each other. Also we would require a mechanism
to prevent the dimensions of the matrix τxy from increasing dramatically with increasing
number states in QI , QJ and alphabets in ΣJ . Therefore we use the state merging algorithm
which is covered in detail in (2). Here we would explain the main steps of the algorithm
in brief. Following from the definition of G-STPN above, here σJn denotes the n
th symbol
observed in system J , and qIJr denotes the r
th joint state observed in the joint state space of
the system I and J . For a multivariate time series we would have to calculate parameters of
G-STPN for each pair of time series x ∈ I and y ∈ J , in the entire system. We f , which is
the total number of time series present in the system. The first step is to evaluate a metric
11
γ(r) which would give us the importance of the rth state as given in the equation below:
γ(r) = ‖Pr(qIJr , σJn)− P¯ r(qIJr , σJ)‖1, r = 1, 2, ...,
f∏
x=1
f∏
y=1;y 6=x
|Qx| × |Qy| (3.1)
where
P¯ r(qIJr , σ
J) =
∏f
y=1 |σy |∑
n=1
Pr(qIJr , σ
J
n)∏f
y=1 |σy|
(3.2)
If γ(r) < η where η is a specified threshold, the state qIJr is identified to be merged to other
states. Then the relevance Γ(r, s) of the two states is defined as:
Γ(r, s) =
∏f
y=1 |σy |∑
n=1
‖Pr(qIJr , σJn)− Pr(qIJs , σJn)‖1,
r, s = 1, 2, ...,
f∏
x=1
f∏
y=1;y 6=x
|Qx| × |Qy|
(3.3)
Γ(r, s) can be applied to find out the closest state qIJs to be merged where γ(s) ≥ η. Also
we can merge states qr and qs if Γ(r, s) ≤ D , where qIJr and qIJs are the states with very
similar transition probabilities and D is a specified threshold.
3.4 Modeling the joint symbol generation matrix
In this section we will model the matrix τxy using the Dirichlet distribution, and find out
an expression for its prior joint density conditioned on a realization (xn, yn) of n data-points
from two variables of the time series X and Y . Recall that τxy depends on the k-lagged
history of (xn) that constitutes the state sequence Q
x
t , the k-lagged history of (yn) that
constitutes the state sequence Qyt , and the symbol sequence (yn) which we denote as S
y
t to
avoid ambiguity. Thus τxy is a structure with |Qxt | × |Qyt | rows and |Syt | columns. After
performing state merging we proceed with the assumption that individual rows
of τxy are statistically independent of each other. Each row of τxy is treated as a
random vector. For the mth row, a prior probability density function gτxym |Qxt ,Qyt ,Syt+1 for the
random matrix τxy conditioned on the joint state-symbol sequence Qxt , Q
y
t , S
y
t+1 (t denoting
12
time index of the variable in observed sequence, from here on we wont be using the subscript
t to make it simpler) following the Dirichlet distribution is described below:
gτxym |Qxt ,Qyt ,Syt+1 =
1
B(αxym )
×
|Σy |∏
n=1
(θxymn)
(αxymn−1) (3.4)
where θxym is a realization of the random vector τ
xy
m , namely θ
xy
mn = [θ
xy
m1θ
xy
m1...θ
xy
m|Σy |], and
the normalizing constant is given by
B(αxym ) ≈
∏Σy
n=1 Γ(α
xy
mn)
Γ(
∑Σy
n=1 α
xy
mn)
(3.5)
where αxymn ≡ [αxym1αxym2...αxym|Σy |] with αxymn = Nxymn + 1 and Nxymn is the number of times the
symbol σyn ∈ Σy is obtained after the joint state qxym ∈ |Qx| × |Qy|. It follows from equation
3.5 that
B(αxym ) =
∏Σy
n=1 Γ(N
xy
mn + 1)
Γ(
∑Σy
n=1N
xy
mn + |Σy|)
=
∏Σy
n=1N
xy
mn!
(Nxymn + |Σy| − 1)! (3.6)
Assuming the Markov property of the learned PFSA, the row vectors of τxy are statistically
independent of each other. Therefore it follows from equations 3.4 and 3.6 that the prior
joint density gτxym |Qxt ,Qyt ,Syt+1 of the joint state symbol generation matrix τ
xy conditioned on
the joint state-symbol sequences Qxt , Q
y
t , S
y
t+1 is given by
gτxy |Qxt ,Qyt ,Syt+1(θ
xy|Qxt , Qyt , Syt+1)
=
|Qx|×|Qy |∏
m=1
(Nxym + |Σy| − 1)!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(θxym )N
xy
mn
Nxymn!
(3.7)
where θxy = [(θxy1 )
T (θxy2 )
T ...(θxy|Qx|×|Qy |)
T ] ∈ [0, 1]|Qx|×|Qy |×|Σx|.
3.5 Modeling self symbol generation matrix
In a way very similar to section 3.4, we will model a matrix Πy using the Dirichlet
distribution and find out an expression for its prior joint density conditioned on a realization
(xn) of n data points from the variable X of the time series. The matrix Π
y is the self state
symbol generation matrix of size |QY |×|ΣY |, the ijth element of ΠY denotes the probability
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of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string S
Y while making a transition from the state
qi ∈ QY . Such a pattern is called atomic pattern in node Y . Alternatively, it can be
viewed as a parameter matrix that can be used to calculate active information storage
(AIS). Elements of the matrix Πy are calculated by marginalizing elements of the matrix
τxy over all possible states qx ∈ |QX |. The prior probability density of the state symbol
generation matrix Πy conditioned on the self state-symbol sequences Qy, Sy will be given
by:
hΠy |Qyt ,Syt+1(θ
Y y|Qyt , Syt+1)
=
|Qy |∏
m=1
(NY ym + |Σy| − 1)!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(θY ym )N
Y y
mn
NY ymn!
(3.8)
where θY y = [(θY y1 )
T (θY y2 )
T ...(θY y|Qy |)
T ] ∈ [0, 1]|Qy |×|Σy |. NY ymn is the number of times the
symbol σyn ∈ Σy is obtained after the state qym ∈ |Qy|. NY ymn can be found out as follows:
NY ymn =
k=|QX |∑
k=1
Nxymnk (3.9)
3.6 Inferring about test observations
G-STPN is a pattern based framework that can capture multiple operating nodes of
a system. A graphical model learned at an instant may not be same as the graphical
model learned at another instant, provided the system moves on to a different mode of
operation. However, this change can be recorded as patterns in the graph connectivity.
The job of importance metric T defined in earlier sections is to represent these changes in
flow of information from one node of the graphical model to another. However, there is no
direct way to infer this change. One way to go about it is to evaluate the likelihood of a
subsequence on data based on past observed data. We first model the nominal distribution
of the data through τxy. During online inference we calculate the likelihood of an observed
small time window of the data based on our prior model. We denote variables collected
during inference phase with a tilde symbol in the superscript. For an observed subsequence
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of symbols in process Y , we denote the joint symbols of X and Y collected in training stage
as Sτ , symbols of Y collected in training stage as Spi and those in inference stage as S˜. We
also use t and k to denote the time point of observed variables in the inference and training
sequences respectively. We call X as the source time series and Y as the target time series.
We are interested in determining the following two probabilities:
1. Probability that a Probabilistic Finite State Automaton (PFSA) with transition ma-
trix τxy and joint state set of |QX | × |QY | generated the subsequence S˜. We call the
model as full (joint) model, and denote the probability as Λxy.
2. Probability that a Probabilistic Finite State Automaton (PFSA) with transition ma-
trix Πy and a state set of |QY | generated the subsequence S˜. We call the model as
reduced (self) model, and denote the probability as λy.
We therefore define Λ and λ as:
Λxy = Pr(Q˜xt , Q˜
y
t , S˜
y
t+1|Qxk, Qyk, Syk+1) ≡ Pr(S˜|Sτ ) (3.10)
λy = Pr(Q˜yt , S˜
y
t+1|Qyk, Syk+1) ≡ Pr(S˜|Spi) (3.11)
We obtain a set of patterns Λxy and λy, for all x and y forming pairs of time series in the
multivariate time series of the system. Let N˜Y ymn denote the number of times in the short
subsequence that the symbol σyn was observed while there was a state qm ∈ |QY |. Then N˜Y ym
denotes the number of times the state qm ∈ |QY | was observed in the short subsequence.
Thus the probability that the self model generated S is given by the product of independent
multinomial distributions.
Pr(S˜|Πy) =
|Qy |∏
m=1
(
˜
NY ym )!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(Πymn)N˜
Y y
mn
N˜Y ymn!
(3.12)
The results from the testing is now conditioned on the training data. Given the symbol
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string Spi in the training phase the probability of observing the symbol string S˜ is given by:
Pr(S˜|Spi) =
∫
...
∫
Pr(S˜|Πy = θy)hΠy |Spi(θy|Spi)dθy
=
∫
...
∫
[
|Qy |∏
m=1
(
˜
NY ym )!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(θymn)N˜
Y y
mn
N˜Y ymn!
]×
[
|Qy |∏
m=1
(NY ym + |Σy| − 1)!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(θY ym )N
Y y
mn
NY ymn!
dθymn]
=
|QY |∏
m=1
(N˜Y ymn)!(N
Y y
m + |ΣY | − 1)!
×
∫
...
∫ ∏|ΣY |
n=1 θ
Y y
mn
N˜Y ymn+N
Y y
mn
dθymn∏|ΣY
n=1(N˜
Y y
mn)!(N
Y y
mn)!
(3.13)
The integrand in equation 3.13 is the density function for the Dirichlet distribution up to
the multiplication of a constant. Hence it follows from equation 3.6 that:∫
...
∫ |ΣY |∏
n=1
θY ymn
N˜Y ymn+N
Y y
mn
dθymn =
∏|ΣY |
n=1 (N˜
Y y
mn +N
Y y
mn)!
(N˜Y ymn +N
Y y
mn + |ΣY | − 1)!
(3.14)
Therefore, the probability of observing the symbol string S˜ is given by:
Pr(S˜|Spi) = λy =
|Qy |∏
m=1
(N˜Y ym )!(N
Y y
m + |Σy| − 1)!
(N˜Y ym +N
Y y
m + |Σy| − 1)!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(N˜Y ymn +N
Y y
mn)!
(N˜Y ymn)!(N
Y y
mn)!
(3.15)
The probability of the joint state-symbol subsequence is also a product of independent multi-
nomial distributions given that the exact joint state symbol generation matrix is known.
Pr(S˜|τxy) =
|Qx|×|Qy |∏
m=1
(N˜xym )!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(τxymn)N˜
xy
mn
N˜xymn!
(3.16)
where, the definition of N˜xymn is similar to N
xy
mn in the context of short subsequence. With
the similar derivation as above, which can be also seen in (20), the metric Λxy(Q˜x, Q˜y, S˜y)
can be obtained as follows
Pr(S˜|Sτ ) = Λxy =
|Qx|×|Qy |∏
m=1
(N˜xym )!(N
xy
m + |Σy| − 1)!
(N˜xym +N
xy
m + |Σy| − 1)!
|Σy |∏
n=1
(N˜xymn +N
xy
mn)!
(N˜xymn)!(N
xy
mn)!
(3.17)
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3.7 Transfer entropy as an importance metric
As a pattern based algorithm we use a metric to capture how important is the interaction
between two time series at a given instant (for a dynamical system having multiple time
series). When inferring about the nature of the observed data, we consider short time
sequences which are collected as the system operates. For each pair of variables X and Y in
the n-point time window of (xn, yn), we calculate the importance metric. The importance
metric T xy should have two desirable properties:
1. It should reflect the degree to which the full model (the model learned by using joint
state space consideration of the target time series and the source time series which is
suspected to have influence on the target time series, or joint patterns in short) yields
a better prediction of the target variable than the reduced model (the model learned
by using the state space of the target time series only, or atomic patterns in short),
as inferred from the given time window.
2. It should easily reflect the importance of the current (joint) pattern with respect to
the learned nominal pattern τxy in the modeling phase.
As a framework that detects anomalies based on dynamics of changes in the influence that
one time series exerts on another (in a multivariate time series setting), we believe that
property 1 is more important than property 2. Transfer entropy has been used successfully
in several applications (9; 10; 11) to estimate this desirable property that we mention in
1. However a tricky issue in evaluating this empirical metric is to come up with accurate
estimates of conditional and joint probabilities to find out conditional entropies. A method
that would use our Dirichlet priors of joint symbol generation matrix and self symbol gen-
eration matrix to improve transfer entropy estimate is left as future work. It is difficult
to evaluate the importance of test data based on prior nominal training data, based on
transfer entropy alone. It is here that we believe that the metrics Λ and λ would be spe-
cially useful in characterizing various stages of the dynamical system. In our experiments
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we use transfer entropy as an importance metric. However to prevent overestimation from
small time windows, we estimate our conditional and joint probabilities from the entire
state space transition matrix observed from nominal training data as well as the transition
matrix observed from the small time window of test data.
3.8 Transfer entropy is a Granger causal metric
Following the proof from (15), it is easy to show that for the multivariate Gaussian case,
the transfer entropy estimator is then just half of the Granger Causality estimator from Y
to X. However for any linear finite-order VAR model, we approach the equivalence, albeit
only asymptotically.
Hlavackova-Schindler (18) extended the equivalence between transfer entropy and Granger
causality to generalized normal variable, which is described as the following lemma for
characterizing the main result in this work.
Lemma 3.8.1 ((15)) For generalized normal variables, the Granger causality and transfer
entropy are equivalent up to a factor of 2.
In the symbolic domain, the transfer entropy is calculated based on different symbol
sequences associated with different dynamic systems. Therefore, Figure 3.1 shows the STPN
frameworks in which the atomic and relational patterns involve the history of observed
data. The following lemma states the relationship between transfer entropy in the symbolic
domain and Granger causality.
Lemma 3.8.2 (Theorem 4.2 (18)) For generalized normal variables, the Granger causality
and transfer entropy in the symbolic domain are equivalent up to a factor of less than or
equal to 2.
The proof of Lemma 3.8.2 follows from Lemma 3.8.1. It suggests that a finer symboliza-
tion can improve the factor, but probably making the transfer entropy computationally
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intractable. A later discussion for computing transfer entropy in practice is given. With
Lemma 3.8.2 in hand, we are ready to state the main theorem in this work.
Theorem 3.8.1 For any bivariate finite-alphabet stationary ergodic Markov process (I, J),
the Granger causality and transfer entropy in the symbolic domain are equivalent.
(Sketch) For a bivariate finite-alphabet stationary ergodic Markov process (I, J), we
first denote by X,Y, and Z the incoming symbol jn+1, the history of process I, i
k
n, and
the history of process of J , jkn, given the current time is n. Based on Lemma 3.8.2, and
the analysis in (18), we can show that the Granger causality and transfer entropy for the
discrete variables in symbolic domain are equivalent to each other.
Such a theorem immediately implies the following corollary for the G-STPN.
Corollary 3.8.1 G-STPN is a Granger causal framework.
Remark 3.8.1 Theorem 3.8.1 implies a significantly important application to time-series
inference under the Markov property assumption. For two different dynamic systems or
variables, their Granger-causal relationship can be quantified by the transfer entropy. The
Corollary 3.8.1 extends the STPN to Granger causal STPN and first time, to our best
knowledge, shows rigorously that G-STPN is Granger-causal framework.
Remark 3.8.2 To summarize, we describe an extension to STPN, the G-STPN which is
shown to have the capability to capture Granger causality across the subsystems, by the
properties of the proposed importance metric. Finally we recall that transfer entropy is
equivalent to Granger causality in multivariate Gaussian case and asymptotically approaches
the original formulation for Granger causality for any linear finite order VAR model.
As we train an RBM in the later sections, we expect to capture the probability distribution
of TˆX−>Y in the form of nominal probability distributions on nominal data. This would in
turn capture the true transfer entropy between two variables as a function of time based on
theorem 3.1.
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CHAPTER 4. AN STPN BASED FRAMEWORK FOR ANOMALY
DETECTION AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Upon learning STPN or G-STPN from multivariate time series data, we can leverage a
combined learning framework based on STPN and Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM)
introduced in (14; 26) for anomaly detection and root-cause analysis. While details can be
found in the original papers, we briefly describe the framework below for completeness.
4.1 Data preprocessing
In this section we cover the main issues which might be encountered from the theory
presented in section 3:
• Finding the optimal number of symbols for symbolizing the (continuous) data collected
from a Cyber-Physical-System (CPS).
• Finding the optimal length of history for calculation of importance metric
• Finding the optimal length of a time window for online calculation of importance
metric.
• Reshaping data to facilitate parallel computing
4.1.1 Transforming time series data from continuous to symbolic domain
In order to calculate the joint state-symbol transition matrix τ and the self state-symbol
transition matrix Π, we would require to approximate the continuous time series using a
fixed number of symbols. The process of generating multidimensional symbol sequences
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from a multidimensional continuous time series is known as partitioning the time series.
Arbitrary assignment of cotinuous interval to symbols may result in erroneous representation
of the original time-series. Thus several well known criteria for creating such partitions
exists such as Kolmogorov-Smirnoff distance (27; 28), minimum misclassification cost (29),
wavelet based partitioning (30), and false nearest neighbor based (31). In our case we
use the Marginal Maximum entropy Partitioning (MMEP). Detailed theoretical discussion
about MMEP is provided in (32). Following the maximum entropy criterion, a time series
may be partitioned in such a way so as to maximize the overall entropy of the partition.
If each interval created by two partitions is denoted by the event J, the entropy of the
partition which we seek to maximize is given by:
H = −
J∑
j=1
PjlogPj (4.1)
Where Pj is the probability associated with the event Ej , which is often calculated using
frequency counting. Then, according to the MMEP criterion, “to approximately maximize
the entropy of a d-dimensional partition for a d-dimensional time series, (d ≥ 2), maximize
the entropy of each one dimensional partition” (32).
4.1.2 Phase space reconstruction and optimal length of history
To find out the components τ and Π of our G-STPN, the state spaces of the interacting
subsystems need to be reconstructed from the symbolized multivariate time series data. For
such purposes, we would use Takens delay embedding (33) with the suggested parameters
by Ragwitz (34) for each component of the multivariate time-series. In the construction of
states of a component X, two main parameters come to play, the embedding delay κ and
the embedding dimension m which determines how far back do we look into the history of
the process. Then each state of X is determined by observing the unique symbol sequence
X
(m)
t = (XtXt−κXt−2κ...Xt−(m−1)κ). For an infinitely long time series with infinite preci-
sion, all values of the delay parameter κ are equivalent. However, in practical situations,
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too large a value of κ may force independence in the successive elements of the embedding
vector. Too small a κ may again introduce strong correlation between the successive embed-
ded elements. In (35), the authors consider the first zero of the autocorrelation function of
Xt as the simplest reasonable estimate of the optimal delay. The autocorrelation function
is given by ρ(k) = γ(k)/γ(0), where γ(k) = Cov(Xt, Xt+k), k ∈ Z. Following the same
method in (35), we perform the nested null hypothesis test
H0 : ρ(k) = 0 versus H1 : ρ(k) 6= 0 (4.2)
The next issue is selection of the embedding dimension m. One popular model free method
is the false nearest neighbors (36). In this method we successively calculate how far the
m-valued and the (m+1) valued state space vectors are distanced from its k-nearest neigh-
bors. The neighbors are declared to be false if the distance grows too much with increase
in dimension and the algorithm increments the value of the embedding dimension m by 1
until no false neighbors are found.
4.1.3 Optimal length of time-window
In the proposed online anomaly detection framework, we collect time windows of stream-
ing data for a fixed length and make our decision over that window. We use overlapping
windows in our analysis of root-causes so that we wait till the required number of skip data
points have been collected for the next window (also called stride). We note that anomaly
in a time series can be caused by one or more anomalous subsequences. Choosing the win-
dow size and stride length is important as larger values may fail to capture important local
features while lower values may result in too high rate of false alarms due to noise. Most of
the time-window based techniques have a user defined window size parameter. Some of the
techniques, as described in (37; 38; 39) use the window size equal to the periodicity of the
data which is computed using the correlogram of the time series. A correlogram is a graphi-
cal representation of the auto correlation functions of the time series which are plotted with
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different lags. It is assumed that if the time series is periodic then the correlation of the
phased lagged version of the time series with its original would produce a maximum value,
if the phase lag is equal to its periodicity. The correlogram also shares the same periodicity
as the process that generates the original time series (38).
4.1.4 Data reshaping
The streaming time series data is stored as a column vector of words in such a way that
ensures re computation of the same values of probability estimators for transfer entropy
is avoided. The table consists of a number of rows which is equal to the size of the time
window. On encountering new streaming data of the size of stride length, some rows are
deleted and the some rows are filled with the new data. Each row stores a unique word in
the format syqxqy, where sy is an unique identifier for a symbol in Y , qx is a unique identifier
for a state in X and qy is an identifier for a state in Y . Each word is also assigned a unique
numerical value in an ascending order based on the number of unique words encountered in
total, and is calculated by using the leftmost bit as the least significant bit. The ordering of
the whole column is always maintained in an ascending order and new elements are inserted
into their respected ordered positions using insertion sort. This arrangement facilitates fast
calculation of parameters for the various maximum likelihood probability estimates used in
the equation for transfer entropy.
4.2 Extraction of spatio-temporal patterns
We present the combined STPN+RBM framework to capture the nominal robotic op-
erations using multivariate time-series data below. Please see (1) for a detail technical
description of this recently proposed framework.
1. Perform maximum entropy partitioning of multivariate time series into a N number
of bins and symbolize the time series as decided by the strategy described in earlier;
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2. For a pair of variables a and b find the state transition matrix Πab where Πaij denotes
the probability of transition from state i in state sequence a to symbol j in symbol
sequence a;
3. For a pair of variables a and b find the joint state transition matrix τab where τabijk
denotes the probability of transition from state i in state sequence a and state j in
state sequence b to symbol k in symbol sequence b;
4. Consider short sub-sequences of symbols from the training sequence and evaluate T ab
∀a, b for each short subsequence;
5. We assign T ab ∀a, b by calculating the transfer entropy from a to b. The real values
obtained are converted to binary patterns by k-nearest neighbor thresholding.
6. Note, we consider a fixed time window W to select the short sub-sequences which is
moved over the entire time series. The binary pattern P ab ∀a, b for one short sub-
sequence (or time window) becomes an input pattern for the RBM training. We get
many such patterns (all considered nominal) from all the time windows defined for
the training data. The RBM is then trained to assign a low free energy value (or high
probability of occurrence) to these training patterns.
4.3 Data driven system calibration by Restricted Boltzmann Machine
(RBM) and subsequent anomaly detection
RBM is an energy based modelling method that takes in an input vector v = (v1, v2, ..., vD),
maps it to a set of hidden vectors h = (h1, h2, ...hF ) = Wv + b, where W is the weight ma-
trix and b is the bias vector. The energy of the configuration (v,h) is defined using the
Boltzmann distribution so that the probability of the configuration is:
P (v, h) =
e−E(v,h)∑
v,h e
−E(v,h) (4.3)
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W and b are typically obtained by maximizing the likelihood of the training data. RBM
can be used to capture multiple operating modes in the system as well as a collection of
weak learners forming a strong learner with STPN interpreting the Granger-causality.
For a graphical model consisting of n subsystems, all the joint and self patterns together
form a binary vector v of length L = n × n. One such binary vector is treated as one
training example for the system-wide RBM (with n2 number of visible units) and many
such examples are generated from different short sub-sequences extracted from the overall
training sequence. Then, the RBM is trained by maximizing the maximum likelihood of
the data, thus calibrating the anomaly detection system for nominal data.
During training, weights and biases are obtained such that the training data has low
energy. During inference then, an anomalous pattern should manifest itself as a low prob-
ability (high energy) configuration. The energy function for an RBM is defined as:
E(v,h) = −hTWv− bTv− cTh
where W are the weights of the hidden units, b and c are the biases of the visible units
and hidden units respectively.
With the weights and biases of RBM, free energy can be computed. Free energy is
defined as the energy that a single visible layer pattern would need to have in order to have
the same probability as all of the configurations that contain v (40), which has the following
expression:
F (v) = −
∑
i
viai −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
i viwij )
The free energy in nominal conditions is noted as F˜ . In cases where there are multiple input
vectors with more than one nominal mode, free energy in the nominal states can be averaged
or used in conjunction with other metrics. In anomalous conditions, a failed pattern will
shift the energy from a lower state to a higher state. If the entire pattern obtained during
test consists of nominal and anomalous patterns, vnom and vano, the combined free energy
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can be obtained as:
F s(v) =−
∑
g
vgag −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
g vgwgj )
−
∑
h
vhah −
∑
j
ln(1 + ebj+
∑
h vhwhj ),
{vg} ∈ vnom, {vh} ∈ vano
An anomalous mode of operation is immediately detected when the value of the free energy
departs significantly from that obtained in case of nominal operation, denoting that a low
probability event has occurred. Although noting the change in the value of free energy in
real time may conclusively suggest anomalous operation, it does not tell anything about the
cause of the failure, thus a root cause analysis technique tries to find out the most probable
subset of vh that explains the deviation in free energy.
4.4 Locating anomalous system operation via root-cause analysis
In the combined STPN+RBM framework described above, anomaly manifests itself as
a low probability (high energy) event. Therefore, the idea for root-cause analysis is to
find potential pattern(s) that, if changed, can transition the system from a high to a low
energy state. With the detected anomalous patterns, node inference (locating anomalous
manipulator joint) is to find a subset that can interpret all the found failed patterns.
In a high level conceptual manner, the way Root Cause Analysis (RCA) works is by
introducing deliberate changes in the patterns (time indexed series of importance metrics)
collected during test in real time (PˆXY ) (Note, however that the patterns need not neces-
sarily be binary). The problem is thus of a sequential search for finding those deliberate
changes that transforms the anomalous patterns to nominal patterns in the closest sense
possible. For the binary case, it is easy to see that such a search progressively flips short
sub-patterns from 0 to 1 and vice versa, thus making it a tractable process unlike patterns
constituted of real numbers. More formally, let us suppose that an inference metric TXYano
changes to TXY ′ano due to an artificial perturbation in the pattern X → Y . We now consider
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a subset of patterns, for which we have the set of inference metrics {TXYano } ⊂ Tano. Let a
perturbation in this subset changes the overall set of metrics to T ′ano. Therefore, we have
the following:
T ′ano =

TXYano if T
XY
ano 6∈ {TXYano }
TXY ′ano if TXYano ∈ {TXYano }
(4.4)
The remaining task is to find the optimal subset of patterns such that the following
condition is satisfied :
{TXYano }? = min{TXYano }
D
(
T ′ano, Tnom
)
, (4.5)
Here D is the Kullback-Liebler distance metric (KLD) (42). KLD is used because it
may be more robust as it takes multiple sub-sequences into account because a persistent
anomaly across the subsequences will cause a significant impact on KLD.
4.5 Sequential state switching (S3)
In the STPN+RBM framework described above, anomaly manifests itself as a low prob-
ability (high energy) event. Therefore, the idea for S3 is to find potential pattern(s) that,
if changed, can transition the system from a high to a low energy state. The probabilities
of existence of joint patterns are discovered by the STPN, and an anomaly will influence
the causality of specific patterns. Hence, by switching/flipping binary patterns P , its con-
tribution on the energy states of the system can be identified and a large contribution may
indicate the root-cause of an anomaly.
It should be noted that free energy F is used in Algorithm 1 to be applied as the distance
metric of the Eq. 4.5, and it can be used along with other metrics such as KLD. Using the
more robust KLD alongside with free energy is particularly useful when the distribution of
free energy is obtained with multiple sub-sequences.
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Algorithm 1 Root-cause analysis with sequential state switching (S3) method
1: procedure STPN+RBM modeling . Algorithm discussed in section 4.2
2: Use the maximum likelihood estimates to compute probability of joint state-symbol
transitions
3: Use the probabilities to compute importance metrics T
4: P ← array of 0 of length = length(T ) . Stores the digitized patterns P of the
G-STPN
5: while i ≤ length(T ):
6: P [i]=knn(T ) . knn is a procedure that takes a real number as input and output
0 if its less than a determined threshold based on elements in T , else 1
7: end while
8: Use extracted patterns of G-STPN (P ) to train RBM that assigns high probabil-
ity(low energy) to nominal data.
9: end procedure
10: procedure Anomaly detection . Algorithm discussed in section 4.3
11: Online anomaly detection via observing the KL divergence of the free energy of RBM
in testing phase from that in training phase.
12: end procedure
13: procedure Root-cause analysis
14: if Anomaly = True then
15: Ec0 ← Es(v) . Ec is the current free energy with input vector v = vnom ∪ vano.
16: vp ← {v : Es(v) < Ec}
17: vano = ∅
18: vnom = v
19: while vp 6= ∅ ∨ {v : Es(v?,ano,vnom) < Ec} = ∅ do
20: Ec ← min(Es(v?,ano ∪ v?i ,vnom)), vi ∈ vp, v?i = 1− vi, v?,ano = 1− vano
21: vano ← vano ∪ {vi : Es(v?,ano ∪ v?i ,vnom) = Ec}
22: vnom ← vnom \ vano
23: vp ← vp \ {vi : Es(v?,ano ∪ v?i ,vnom) = Ec}
24: end while
25: end if
26: A bijective function: g : P→ v
27: Pano = g−1(vano)
28: return Pano
29: end procedure
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Figure 4.1 A two-state case of anomalous condition with two sub-systems. The state
transitions between the subsystems a and b are first defined in the nominal
condition (shown in the top panel) assuming the depth D = 1 and the time lag
p = 1. Then, in the anomalous condition, changes occur from the state qa1 to
the state qa2 in the subsystem a and we assume that the changes only exist in
the transitions qa1 → qb1 (i.e., they change to qa2 → qb1 due to the anomaly). The
Hamming distance between the sequence for the subsystem a in the anomalous
condition and that in the nominal condition is ηa.
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CHAPTER 5. A PRACTICAL CASE OF ANOMALY DETECTION
We now move on to an experimental case study to show that STPN or G-STPN can
capture the dynamics of a system using multivariate time series originating from the system,
such that anomalous operations of the system can be discriminated from nominal operation
and the source of the anomaly can also be isolated. In literature, this is known as anomaly
detection and root cause analysis which is crucial for safety-critical and attack resilient
systems.
5.1 Motivation and existing literature
Majority of the manufacturing industries have seen a tremendous rise of industrial robot
usage in recent years. With the advent of service robots such as Baxter, Sawyer and
Kuka (43; 44; 45; 46), there has been an increased focus in deploying these user friendly
robots in industrial environments alongside their human counterparts. In this age of Internet
of Things (IOT), most industrial robots need to be connected to the internet (intranet)
to enable remote communication with the operator and/or other robots. This opens a
window for hackers to get access to and manipulate these robots with malicious intent (47).
Depending on the final goal, the hacker may use the large quantity of data generated and
processed by the robot’s sensors for espionage as well as to simply sabotage the operation
of the industry by altering the operation of the robot and/or disabling actuators (48).
There has been numerous recent research in anomaly detection and characterization for
robotic systems. In (49), sequential image data is extracted from the robot system using
monocular camera and mapped to a lower dimensional feature space using convolutional
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neural networks. Anomalies are detected by comparing the actual data with the predicted
behavior using the learnt features. In (50), multi-modal observations are collected from
non-anomalous performances and used to train a Hidden-Markov Model (HMM). A combi-
nation of self-organizing maps (SOM) with spatial context mapping for the spatial domain
and generative probabilistic graphical models for the temporal domain is used in (51) to
detect anomalies. In (52), the authors propose to generate adaptive thresholds using locally
linear models (LLM) and Model Error Modeling (MEM) techniques for fault detection on
two wheeled mobile robot. Using Variational autoencoders (VAE) with Recurrent Neural
Networks (RNNs) as encoders and decoders as a generative time series model, the authors
in (53) showed that anomalous cases can be detected successfully. Other recent works using
hybrid timed automata (54; 55), k nearest neighbors (56), sensor redundancy (57), and
various robot introspective frameworks (58; 59) have also been done for anomaly detection
in robotics systems.
While physical failures occurring within a robot can be easily observed and monitored,
intelligent hacks meant to reduce overall productivity can be very hard to detect. In this
work, we discuss three main ways in which a robotic operation can be sabotaged in an
intelligent manner and ways to detect such anomalies occurring in the system. We propose
to use the concepts of the spatiotemporal pattern networks (STPN) (1) to learn the temporal
characteristics of individual variables involved in the robotic system as well as Granger-
causal relationships (60; 15) among the different variables.
5.2 Data and testbed
In this work we have used time series data collected from the one-handed manipulator
Sawyer for simulating and detecting anomalies. A schematic of the Sawyer robot showing
the degrees of freedom and joint assignment is shown in figure 5.1. This will be necessary
for indicating the anomalies. In this experiment, the data collected is spatially correlated
multivariate time-series.
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Figure 5.1 Description of the joints
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The data collected has 27 controlled variables denoting the angular position, velocity
and acceleration for each of the seven joints (joints J0 through J6 in the figure 5.1), the
head pan and the linear position, velocity and acceleration of the gripper. The remaining 19
observed variables denote the five 3-dimensional variables (i.e., position, linear twist, angular
twist, wrench force, and wrench torque) for x,y and z dimensions and one 4-dimensional
variable (i.e., orientation) of the end effector. By the experimental setup, there is a causal
relationship between controlled and observed variables. In the different ways as mentioned
in section 6 we change controlled variables, simulating a cyber-attack, and try to detect the
change using only observed variables.
5.3 Comparing STPN and G-STPN
Before analyzing the data for anomaly detection and root-cause analysis, we numerically
compare the information captured by STPN and G-STPN. Note that for both STPN and
G-STPN, the importance metrics (mutual information for relational patterns and transfer
entropy for joint patterns respectively) are extremely crucial. The importance metric is
central to the STPN+RBM framework for anomaly detection and root cause analysis. In
most of the earlier work using STPN, joint patterns were not considered while calculating
importance metrics. Earlier we also mention in remark 3.2.1 that as a consequence it
may be difficult to “condition out” past histories. In table 1, we compare the information
values extracted from relational patterns as in the STPN framework used in (13) and the
information values extracted from joint patterns in our G-STPN framework. We note that
as the length of history increases, more the gap becomes more apparent with the G-STPN
importance metric increasing in comparison to the other metric and gradually plateauing
at length of history equal to 3, from whereon it eventually reduces in value. All the while
the value of Relational Pattern(RP) in STPN stabilizes at length of history equal to 1, with
minor fluctuations at increasing depths.
It seems that an the increase in value of information is achieved at a forbiddingly high
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computational complexity for G-STPN. Ideally it involves searching through the joint (three
dimensional) product space of states and symbols of the two sub-systems in consideration.
However we note that:
• Structured data (in most real cases) after symbolization is supposed to contain only
a fixed number of observable transitions in the corresponding Markov process, thus
although the search space is of the dimension |SY | × |QX | × |QY |, the actual number
of unique observed transitions qx × qy −→ sy would be considerably lower.
• The calculation of transfer entropy can be significantly accelerated by parallel com-
putation, following a pre-indexing technique as described in section 4.2. Table 1 also
gives the corresponding time in seconds used to calculate importance metrics for G-
STPN.
We now describe the experiment used to investigate the difference between the two
methods empirically. Considering the dynamics of the robot, the base joint (joint 0), as
shown in figure 5.1, highly influences the movement of other joints in the serially connected
links. Thus, a metric that is designed to capture causality would be appropriately used in
determining importance metrics from the joint 0 to a close link (joint 3) and to the last link
(joint 6). We gradually vary the depth of the Markov Machines from 1 to 3. We observe
that the difference between transfer entropy and the mutual information gradually increases
with increase in depth as shown in the Table 5.1.
As discussed before, finding the optimal length of history, the number of symbols for
symbolization of continuous data, and the length of collected data that is good enough for
unbiased estimation of transfer entropy are three main continuing challenges in the field.
We address these issues in section 4. In the sequel, we present the detailed experimental
setup and the anomaly detection and root-cause results.
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Table 5.1 Transfer entropy (TE) for Joint Patterns(JP) and Mutual Information (MI) for
Relational Patterns(RP)
Variable Pair Depth TE for JP MI for RP Time taken for TE
value (bits) value (bits) value (seconds)
joint 0 to joint 3 positions 1 0.907 0.920 7.0
2 1.396 0.974 15.0
3 1.481 0.828 20.6
4 1.35 0.801 38.0
joint 0 to joint 6 positions 1 0.827 0.792 6.5
2 1.317 0.878 14.3
3 1.403 0.794 22.0
4 1.27 0.750 35.3
35
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Attack injection
All the attack types are visualized with time series of image frames in figure 6.1.
Type 1: Controller hack: For controller hack we simply change the controlled value
of joint 0, 2, 3, and 4, four arbitrarily selected joints. The values of joints 0 and 3 is
multiplied by a time-dependent error factor ei which has the following form
ei =

|c−i|
c , if i ≤ c
|i|
c , otherwise i>c.
where, c is a positive constant defined specifically in the experiments and i is the time index
of first c points in dataset Q. Then the values of joints 2 and 4 is multiplied by the same
time-dependent error factor ei with a time shift.
ei =

|d+c−i|
c , if i ≤ d+ c2
|i−d|
c , otherwise i>d+
c
2 .
where, c and d are positive constants defined specifically in the experiments and i is the
time index in dataset Q between indices d and d+ c.
Type 2: Communication delay: For simulating communication delay, we set the
first c controlled values of joint 3 equal to the value of the first data point (i.e., a zero order
hold) and then after the cth data point every value for joint 3 is defined by the following
Q(i, 3) =

Q(1, 3), if i ≤ c
Q(i− c, 3) otherwise i>c.
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Figure 6.1 Time frames showing the task execution in nominal and anomalous conditions
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Type 3: Trajectory manipulation: For simulating intelligent attacks of type (3)
we use the MoveIt! inverse kinematics library with visualization in Rviz. The library is
typically used to solve the inverse kinematics problem of the desired minimum path length
trajectory for a given starting and ending end effector position and orientation. Nominal
training data is obtained by collecting C and J for a given starting and ending position
and orientation of end effector. Anomaly is introduced by placing an imaginary obstacle
at a certain point in the shortest path trajectory forcing the inverse kinematics library to
calculate a longer path for the same task.
6.2 STPN+RBM models
The method used in this work is predominantly based on STPN. Thus, in this section
we visualize and discuss the probabilistic graphical model representations of our robotic
system under the three different anomaly cases. The figure 6.2 below shows the graphical
models derived from the underlying raw measurement data. It is the penultimate step in our
anomaly detection algorithm after the atomic and relational patterns have been thresholded
to a value of either 0 or 1 using K nearest neighbors method and is ready to be fed to the
RBM as a series of training data that covers the entire length of the observed nominal
data. The graphical representation of the system has been simplified only for visualization
purpose. We consider an undirected link between two nodes/variables a and b if there is
a significant relationship between the variables from both directions as evidenced by the
metric T ab. Note that the metric values are averaged over all time windows during both
nominal and anomalous conditions and we only consider the links relevant for the injected
anomalies. In figure 6.2, we can clearly see the changes in overall graph connectivity due
to the injected anomalies. Implicitly, such results demonstrate that the proposed STPN
framework can capture the anomalies of different types for the robotic system.
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Figure 6.2 Derived graphical models with 3 types of anomalies: (a) controller hack; (b)
communication delay; (c) trajectory manipulation
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Figure 6.3 Raw Data and free energy of RBM under nominal and anomalous conditions
for the controller hack
Figure 6.4 Raw Data and free energy of RBM under nominal and anomalous conditions
for the trajectory manipulation
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Figure 6.5 Raw Data and free energy of RBM under nominal and anomalous conditions
for the communication delay
6.3 Spatio-temporal anomaly detection
The root cause anomaly detection algorithm proposed is able to detect causes of system
anomaly on both spatial and temporal scales providing explanations of failure at each indi-
vidual subsystem as well as the explanations for failure because of anomalous interactions
occurring at certain time points of operation between subsystems. The results essentially
present us with a 3 dimensional graph with nodes, time points, and anomaly scores as x,
y and z axis respectively. To simplify the interpretation, we take the average of all the
anomaly scores along time and along nodes to produce two explanations:
1. Time averaged node anomaly score presented in figure 6.7 for both G-STPN and
STPN frameworks
2. Node averaged time anomaly score presented in figure 6.9 for both G-STPN and STPN
frameworks
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The time period of operation of the robot is roughly 35 seconds. This work is repeatedly
performed and recorded as nominal data for around 12 minutes. The frequency of data
collection is 100 datapoints per second. The Window size for extracting importance metrics
is 2000 points(=20s), the window stride length is 10(=0.1s). During inference in RCA, a
collection of 50 windows are considered together(=5s resolution for anomaly detection). We
call each of these collection of 50 windows an instant.
For communication delay, Joint 4 was programmed to have the time lag anomaly and
the time averaged node score (G-STPN) across the nodes shows that node 4 is the most
anomalous. In the plot of node averaged time scores (G-STPN-right) peaks are detected at
roughly 7 instant intervals (= 35s intervals), the time period of one cycle of operation.
For controller hack, in the time averaged node score plot (G-STPN), joint 1,3,4,5 con-
trollers had been programmed for anomaly, for the mid line separating lowest and highest
scores, position anomalies of 1,3 and 5 are detected, velocity anomaly of 4 is detected, and
acceleration anomaly of 1,3,4 are detected. In the node averaged time score plot (G-STPN)
plateaus of about 1 instant(=5s) long are observed (in real anomaly the most observable
deviation is also 5s long). As usual, the time gap between the distinct features are around
7 instants (=35 s). It is evident by comparison, that for these considered cases, the results
offered by G-STPN is more stable and accurate over the results offered by STPN.
6.4 Performance analysis
Figures 6.3 - 6.5 show the raw data with free energy outputs generated by the trained
RBM. For the raw data, we combine the time-series of every variable and show them within
one plot. For all of three cases, results show that anomaly patterns in the raw data can be
immediately captured by the trained RBM by comparing the nominal and anomalous free
energy. It can be observed that the case of communication delay has the most significant
variation in free energy for the anomalous condition. The free energy value increases imme-
diately from around -7000 to around -4000. Moreover, compared to the controller hack and
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Figure 6.6 Experiment was performed on the robot by repeating cycles of operation for
communication delay. We averaged the anomaly scores for each nodes at each
time instant to look at the average individual node anomaly score throughout
the experiment.
Figure 6.7 Experiment was performed on the robot by repeating cycles of operation for
controller hack. We averaged the anomaly scores for each nodes at each time
instant to look at the average individual node anomaly score throughout the
experiment. G-STPN is able to capture the anomalous angular position, ve-
locity and acceleration for joint 3 in both communication delay and controller
hack
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Figure 6.8 Experiment was performed on the robot by repeating cycles of operation for
communication delay. We averaged the anomaly scores for each nodes at each
time instant to look at the average individual anomaly score at each time
instant throughout the experiment across all the nodes. Notice that G-STPN
using transfer entropy captures a better signature than STPN
Figure 6.9 Experiment was performed on the robot by repeating cycles of operation for
controller hack. We averaged the anomaly scores for each nodes at each time
instant to look at the average individual anomaly score at each time instant
throughout the experiment across all the nodes. Notice that G-STPN using
transfer entropy captures a better signature than STPN
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communication delay, the trajectory manipulation shows less significant variation in free
energy, which may be attributed to the uncertain joints as most of joints are involved in
the trajectories. We now discuss the root-cause analysis results using our proposed scheme.
Figure 6.10 shows the root causes corresponding to controller hack and communication de-
lay. In the case of controller hack, anomalies are injected to joints 0, 2, 3, and 4. Along
with those, joint 5 is also considered as anomaly because its directly connected to the 2,
3, 4 chains. By using the proposed approach, except joint 5, the rest of four joints can be
isolated correctly. As joint 5 is next to joint 4 the isolation of joint 4 may negatively affect
the isolation of joint 5. For the communication delay, it can be observed that the anomaly
is injected to joint 3. Although eventually using the proposed RCA method enables us
to isolate three joints, i.e., joints 0, 3, and 4, where anomalies are detected, joint 3 can be
correctly detected to help operators locate the attacks. Joint 4 is also isolated in this case as
it is close to joint 3 while for joint 0, the reason may be attributed to the robot’s dynamics
which is not analyzed in detail in this work. For the case of trajectory manipulation, we
can know that when a block is placed in the path from starting point to end, joints can be
observed to move for avoiding the block. However, it is difficult to determine the ground
truth in terms of joints as the trajectories involve most of the joints. Also, based on the
proposed algorithm, results show that most of joints are involved so the isolation of joints
are not provided for the root-cause analysis in the trajectory manipulation case.
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Figure 6.10 Actual anomaly and detected anomaly associated with the defined joints for
the controller hack and communication delay
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
This work explored the notion of Granger causality in the context of a recently proposed
spatiotemporal graphical modeling technique called, STPN. We show tha Granger causality
can be captured by modifying the STPN formulation slightly which leads to a variant called
the G-STPN. Upon learning STPN or G-STPN, a combined learning framework involving
restricted Boltzmann machines (RBM) can be used to perform anomaly detection and
root-cause analysis in complex dynamical systems. We demonstrate the efficacy of such a
decision framework using a real experimental case study involving cyber-physical attacks on
an industrial robotic platform. We also empirically observe that in certain cases, information
content of the STPN patterns can approximate that of G-STPN patterns with significantly
lower computational expense. However, a significantly more rigorous study is required to
understand this approximation correctly which will be the most important future work. Few
other future research directions will include: 1) identifying optimal depth/memory to be
considered in STPN or G-STPN; 2) setting up a quantification framework for evaluating the
root-cause isolation step; 2) understanding temporal characteristics of attack propagation
through a dynamical system; 3) development of on-line attack mitigation strategies.
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